An example of SIM swap fraud prevention as a governed process: agents do the 7 steps, and a person signs the gate before anything irreversible happens. Download it, import it into your workspace, and adapt it to your systems.
The graph7 agent steps1 human gatesigns: Lead fraud-defense analyst (number-release authority)
SIM-swap / port-out fraud-defense autopilot
SIM-swap, port-out and account-takeover triage is manual, slow and fragmented across OSS/BSS, IDV and case tools while a single mistaken auto-approval hands a victim's phone number and every OTP-protected account to an attacker. The FCC 2024 mandate adds hard notification and authentication obligations on top of a fraud-loss exposure of $5-25M a year. Routine, low-risk SIM-changes and port-outs are scored and auto-cleared in seconds with FCC-mandated customer notifications fired automatically, while genuinely risky or anomalous requests are held with a written risk verdict. Only those reach a certified fraud analyst, who signs the irreversible number-release or port-out authorization with a complete authentication trail.
The governed flow · branches, parallel work & a human on the irreversible step
low risk AND secure auth (47 CFR 64.2010) satisfiedaccount locked / port-freeze setelevated / high riskapproveddenied
Start
agent · low risk
Ingest the SIM-change / port-out / account-takeover request and pull subscriber, line and device-of-record context from OSS/BSS
agent · medium risk
Score the attempt on behavioral, device, network and identity signals (SIM/device churn, port-velocity, geo/IP anomaly, IDV) and check for a customer-set account-lock / port-freeze, then classify risk
decision
Fraud risk?
agent · low risk
Low risk: auto-clear only after §64.2010 secure authentication passes, against policy with a full authentication trail and fire the FCC notification — a reversible, in-policy change
agent · medium risk
Elevated risk: stage the case, force enhanced verification, fire the FCC notification and freeze the line pending review; handle failed/repeated authentication per the §64.2010 failed-auth procedure (lockout/escalate)
agent · medium risk
Account is locked / port-frozen by the customer (47 CFR 64.2010 + 52.37): hard-hold the request, fire the FCC notification, and route to signoff for an authenticated step-up / in-person override — never auto-clear
gate · human sign-off
A certified fraud analyst confirms identity on the flagged account and signs (or denies) the irreversible number-release / port-out with the authentication trailsigns: Certified fraud-defense analyst (number-release authority)
agent · high riskirreversible
Execute the approved SIM swap or port-out: provision the new SIM / release the number to the gaining carrier
agent · low risk
Monitor the number for post-change abuse, log dispositions for the FCC audit trail, and route confirmed fraud to recovery and chargeback
Done
low riskmedium riskhigh riskbranch / reworkgate · human sign-off
What it is modelled on
Releasing a number to a new SIM is effectively irreversible during the attack window — it hands over the victim's 2FA — so high-risk port-out/SIM-change requests require a stepped-up human verification before the number is released.
Rule
What it requires
FCC SIM-swap & port-out protection rules
The FCC requires carriers to use secure customer-authentication methods before a SIM change or number port-out and to notify the customer of SIM-change and port-out requests on the account.
Port-out / number-release controls
A number should not be released or re-provisioned to a new SIM without passing step-up authentication, because a successful swap hands over the victim's calls, texts and 2FA codes.
CPNI safeguards
Customer Proprietary Network Information must be protected, so identity checks around account changes can't leak account data to a social engineer.
A summary for orientation, not legal advice.
Use this example
01
Download the file
A minctrl.process/v1 document: the graph and the hash of the process it becomes.
02
Import it in Processes
Import into Minctrl opens this example in your workspace; one click stores it as your first version. Import JSON does the same with the file, and a file changed after download is refused.
03
Connect your systems
Every connector starts in shadow: steps run, nothing leaves Minctrl until you configure a connector and switch it live.
04
Adapt it
Change signers, time limits and steps on the canvas. Each save is a new version; a running case stays on the version it started with.
Questions
How does SIM-swap fraud-prevention automation align with the FCC rules?+
The flow enforces secure customer authentication before any SIM change or number port-out and notifies the customer of the request, in line with the FCC's SIM-swap and port-out protection rules. Every request and check is logged with a tamper-evident audit hash.
Why is a number release gated instead of automated?+
Because releasing a number to a new SIM is effectively irreversible during the attack window — it hands the victim's calls, texts and 2FA codes to the attacker. High-risk port-out and SIM-change requests park for a stepped-up human verification before the number is released; the AI clears the clearly-legitimate, low-risk volume.
How does the system decide which requests are high-risk?+
The AI agent scores each request against account signals — recent password or SIM changes, device and location anomalies, failed authentication — and applies step-up authentication. Requests that clear low-risk proceed; anything elevated routes to a human, and the rationale is recorded.