Example processtelecom

SIM swap fraud prevention automation software

An example of SIM swap fraud prevention as a governed process: agents do the 7 steps, and a person signs the gate before anything irreversible happens. Download it, import it into your workspace, and adapt it to your systems.

Download example · JSONImport into Minctrl →

minctrl.process/v1 · hash 1c10ec104667…0e37

The graph7 agent steps1 human gatesigns: Lead fraud-defense analyst (number-release authority)

SIM-swap / port-out fraud-defense autopilot

SIM-swap, port-out and account-takeover triage is manual, slow and fragmented across OSS/BSS, IDV and case tools while a single mistaken auto-approval hands a victim's phone number and every OTP-protected account to an attacker. The FCC 2024 mandate adds hard notification and authentication obligations on top of a fraud-loss exposure of $5-25M a year. Routine, low-risk SIM-changes and port-outs are scored and auto-cleared in seconds with FCC-mandated customer notifications fired automatically, while genuinely risky or anomalous requests are held with a written risk verdict. Only those reach a certified fraud analyst, who signs the irreversible number-release or port-out authorization with a complete authentication trail.

The governed flow · branches, parallel work & a human on the irreversible step
low risk AND secure auth (47 CFR 64.2010) satisfiedaccount locked / port-freeze setelevated / high riskapproveddenied
Start
agent · low risk
Ingest the SIM-change / port-out / account-takeover request and pull subscriber, line and device-of-record context from OSS/BSS
agent · medium risk
Score the attempt on behavioral, device, network and identity signals (SIM/device churn, port-velocity, geo/IP anomaly, IDV) and check for a customer-set account-lock / port-freeze, then classify risk
decision
Fraud risk?
agent · low risk
Low risk: auto-clear only after §64.2010 secure authentication passes, against policy with a full authentication trail and fire the FCC notification — a reversible, in-policy change
agent · medium risk
Elevated risk: stage the case, force enhanced verification, fire the FCC notification and freeze the line pending review; handle failed/repeated authentication per the §64.2010 failed-auth procedure (lockout/escalate)
agent · medium risk
Account is locked / port-frozen by the customer (47 CFR 64.2010 + 52.37): hard-hold the request, fire the FCC notification, and route to signoff for an authenticated step-up / in-person override — never auto-clear
gate · human sign-off
A certified fraud analyst confirms identity on the flagged account and signs (or denies) the irreversible number-release / port-out with the authentication trailsigns: Certified fraud-defense analyst (number-release authority)
agent · high riskirreversible
Execute the approved SIM swap or port-out: provision the new SIM / release the number to the gaining carrier
agent · low risk
Monitor the number for post-change abuse, log dispositions for the FCC audit trail, and route confirmed fraud to recovery and chargeback
Done
low riskmedium riskhigh riskbranch / reworkgate · human sign-off
What it is modelled on

Releasing a number to a new SIM is effectively irreversible during the attack window — it hands over the victim's 2FA — so high-risk port-out/SIM-change requests require a stepped-up human verification before the number is released.

RuleWhat it requires
FCC SIM-swap & port-out protection rulesThe FCC requires carriers to use secure customer-authentication methods before a SIM change or number port-out and to notify the customer of SIM-change and port-out requests on the account.
Port-out / number-release controlsA number should not be released or re-provisioned to a new SIM without passing step-up authentication, because a successful swap hands over the victim's calls, texts and 2FA codes.
CPNI safeguardsCustomer Proprietary Network Information must be protected, so identity checks around account changes can't leak account data to a social engineer.

A summary for orientation, not legal advice.

Use this example
01

Download the file

A minctrl.process/v1 document: the graph and the hash of the process it becomes.

02

Import it in Processes

Import into Minctrl opens this example in your workspace; one click stores it as your first version. Import JSON does the same with the file, and a file changed after download is refused.

03

Connect your systems

Every connector starts in shadow: steps run, nothing leaves Minctrl until you configure a connector and switch it live.

04

Adapt it

Change signers, time limits and steps on the canvas. Each save is a new version; a running case stays on the version it started with.

Questions
How does SIM-swap fraud-prevention automation align with the FCC rules?

The flow enforces secure customer authentication before any SIM change or number port-out and notifies the customer of the request, in line with the FCC's SIM-swap and port-out protection rules. Every request and check is logged with a tamper-evident audit hash.

Why is a number release gated instead of automated?

Because releasing a number to a new SIM is effectively irreversible during the attack window — it hands the victim's calls, texts and 2FA codes to the attacker. High-risk port-out and SIM-change requests park for a stepped-up human verification before the number is released; the AI clears the clearly-legitimate, low-risk volume.

How does the system decide which requests are high-risk?

The AI agent scores each request against account signals — recent password or SIM changes, device and location anomalies, failed authentication — and applies step-up authentication. Requests that clear low-risk proceed; anything elevated routes to a human, and the rationale is recorded.

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